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WILL THE EUROPEAN UNION PACKAGING DIRECTIVE
RECONCILE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT?
Alexandra Haner*
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, environmentalists and proponents of free
trade have been at odds with one another.1 A recent General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 ("GATT" or "General Agree-
ment") ruling that a tuna embargo, pursuant to a U.S. law pro-
tecting dolphins, 3 was an unfair trade barrier illustrates the clash
between free trade and environmental protection.4 To protect
endangered habitats, species, and resources, environmentalists
have helped weave a safety net of national laws and international
agreements. 5 Free trade advocates, however, regard these laws
as protectionist barriers that impede the flow of commerce.
6
From a GATT perspective, a potential conflict between free
trade and environmental advocates could arise from the Euro-
pean Union7 ("EU" or "Union") directive8 regarding packaging
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University.
1. See Tom Wathen, A Guide to Trade and the Environment, in TaDE AND THE ENvi-
RONMENT, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND Potucv 3 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993) (illustrat-
ing conflict between free trade and environmental preservation); Ralph Nader, Trade in
Secrets, WASH. POST, OCt. 6, 1994, at A31 (noting that all U.S. environmental groups,
even those who supported NAFTA, opposed GATT).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1950) [hereinafter GATT 1947]. The objective of GATT was
to induce nations to liberalize trade barriers without resorting to tariffs or quotas, which
were found to be debilitating to trade. JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCrURING THE GATT
SYSTEM 9-10 (1990).
3. U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) [hereinafter MMPA]. The MMPA allows the Secretary of Treasury to ban im-
ports from other countries that buy fish for reexport from the offending country. Id.
An offending country is defined as one whose fishermen kill more dolphins than U.S.
fishermen do. Id.
4. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report
on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter
Tuna Panel II] (noting EU challenge of U.S. secondary embargo on yellowfin tuna
from countries that import and process tuna from offending nations).
5. Wathen, supra note 1, at 20.
6. Id. at 20-21.
7. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1
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and packaging waste for commercial products ("Packaging Di-
rective" or "Directive").' Adopted December 20, 1994,10 the Di-
rective establishes guidelines to harmonize measures in Member
States concerning the management of packaging waste and to
eliminate unfair trade practices in the European Union." It ap-
plies to all packaging of products sold in the European Union
and affects all EU and non-EU companies that sell products in
the EU market.1 2
In the European Union, each Member State enacts separate
legislation to fulfill the objective of a directive."3 Therefore, fif-
teen sets of laws and regulations will result from the implementa-
tion of the Directive. 4 As a result, a Member State may adopt
legislation 1" under the Directive that favors EU countries over
C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
247 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-1I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act,
OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISH-
ING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). Before the Treaty of the
European Union, the collective Member States were called the European Community
("EC" or "Community"). See EC Treaty, supra (referring to European Community).
After the TEU, the Member States are now called the European Union. See TEU, supra
(referring to European Union). The European Union is an organization of fifteen
European nations. Id. The twelve Member States before the recent accession were
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Id. On January 1, 1995, Finland,
Sweden, and Austriajoined the Union. Decision of the Council of the European Union
of 1 January 1995 Adjusting the Instruments Concerning the Accession of New Member
States to the European Union, O.J. L. 1/1 (1995).
8. See EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 189(3). "A directive shall be binding, as to the
result to be achieved, upon each member-state ... but shall leave to the national au-
thorities the choice of form and methods." Id.
9. European Parliament and Council Directive No. 94/62/EC, O.J. L 365/10
(1994) [hereinafter Packaging Directive].
10. Id.
11. See id. art. 1 (1), O.J. L 365/10, at 12 (seeking to provide environmental protec-
tion and to avoid obstacles to trade that restrict competition within European Commu-
nity).
12. Id. art. 2(1), OJ. L 365/10, at 12. "This Directive covers all packaging place on
the market in the Community and all packaging waste, whether it is used or released at
industrial, commercial, office, shop, service, household or any other level, regardless of
the material used." Id.
13. See supra note 8 (noting that Member States are allowed to pass own laws and
regulations to implement directive).
14. See supra note 7 (naming fifteen Member States).
15. SeeJohn H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congnence or
Conflict?, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, LAw, ECONOMICS, AND Poucy 219, 222
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non-EU countries and that may be construed as a non-tariff bar-
rier to trade.' 6 Such a restriction to trade between the European
Union and a non-EU country allows a nation to bring a com-
plaint before a World Trade Organization ("WTO") tribunal. 7
This Comment examines the issue of whether the Packag-
ing Directive, meant to protect the health and safety of EU citi-
zens and the environment, could be construed as a non-tariff
trade barrier. Part I provides an overview of the general debate
between trade and the environment and relevant EU laws and
GATT disputes. Part II discusses the history and pertinent provi-
sions of the Directive. Part III argues that the Directive is a not
non-tariff trade barrier. This Comment concludes that direc-
tives, such as the Packaging Directive, that balance free trade
and environmental protection, are a harbinger of future legisla-
tion and treaties.
I. RECENT TRADE-ENVIRONMENT BATTLES
Free trade has come under attack from environmentalists
who argue that international free trade fosters the exploitation
of natural resources.' 8 Proponents of free trade consider oner-
(Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993) (providing hypothetical situation where GATT over-
sight may be triggered).
[A member country] establishes a rule that requires a special deposit or tax on
packaging that is not biodegradable, arguing that such packages are a danger
to the environment. It so happens that [the member country's] producers use
a different package that is not so taxed. Only the packages from [importing
countries] are affected.
Id.
16. See A- G. KENwOOD & A. L. LOUGHEED, THE GROWTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY 1820-1990, at 280 (1992) (defining non-tariff barrier as rule restricting quan-
tity of imports between countries). "The types of [non-tariff] measures used were va-
ried in character but orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs) and voluntary export
restraints (VERs) were the most common. The effectiveness ofJapan's penetration of
American and European markets was of major concern to those countries and was the
initial reason for such [non-tariff barrier] restrictions." Id.
17. See General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs: Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994] (providing organization to implement
and administer rules and regulations governing international trade agreed to in Uru-
guay Round and in future global trade negotiations). Id. art. III, at 1145. The World
Trade Organization encompasses trade agreements involving goods, services, and intel-
lectual property rights. Id. art. II, at 1144.
18. ThomasJ. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment:
Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 Am. J. Irr'L L. 700, 700 (1992). "The GATT is under attack by
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ous environmental regulations to be a barrier to free trade. 19 A
mechanism for one country to resolve its trade disputes with an-
other country is to utilize the WTO dispute resolution mecha-
nism. ° In the European Union, the mechanism for resolving
trade disputes is' through the EU court system.2'
A. Free Trade Versus Environmental Protection
Proponents of free trade and environmental protection are
at odds over the correct policy to pursue. 22 Free trade advocates
want to remove all barriers to trade throughout the world.2 3 En-
vironmentalists fear that eliminating all barriers to trade will
weaken environmental regulations.24  Nowhere is this conflict
more clear than in the clash between developing25 and devel-
oped 2 6 countries regarding environmental regulations. 27 Devel-
oped countries believe GATT may erode the environmental ini-
some in the environmental community who charge that international free trade blindly
fosters the exploitation of natural resources." Id.
19. See, e.g., id. (noting that passage of U.S. Clean Air Amendments of 1990 would
impose costs on U.S. factories that would make them less competitive with those in
other countries).
20. See General Agreement on Tariff and Trade: Understanding on Rules and Pro-
cedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, annex 2, art. 4, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1228
(1994) [hereinafter GATT DSB] (describing procedure for dispute resolution).
21. See GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGERJ. GOEBEL, WILLIAMJ. DAVEY, ELEANOR M. Fox,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 69 (1993) (describing European
court system and European Court of Justice, final arbiter in resolving disputes).
22. See Wathen, supra note 1, at 4 (describing three broad approaches to interna-
tional trade: protectionism, free trade, and managed trade).
23. Id. at 5.
24. See Wendell Berry, A Big Bad Idea, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE 158, 159
(1993) (arguing that harmonization is GATT euphemism for lowering standards to low-
est international common denominator).
25. See Robert Cassen et al., Overview, in RjCH COUNTRY INTERESTS AND THIRD
WoRD DEVELOPMENT 1, 5 (Robert Cassen et al. eds., 1982) (describing four groups of
developing countries). There are at least four groups of developing countries: OPEC
nations with large financial surpluses; newly industrialized countries that are expanding
rapidly; middle income countries whose economies are expanding but still depend on
exports of primary products; and low income countries with a per capita income of less
than US$350 per year. Id.
26. See THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES,
NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL 31 (1980) (noting that developed countries
are those countries that have industrialized market economies). They have a quarter of
the world's population but control four-fifths of the world's income. Id. at 32.
27. See Wathen, supra note 1, at 10 (explaining why free trade advocates fear envi-
ronmental regulation). "Free trade advocates fear that stronger measures to protect
the environment will stifle open business competition between nations. For example,
companies from developing countries may not have the technology or expertise to
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tiatives that they have long sought.28 Developing countries, on
the other hand, argue that environmental standards are merely
protectionism in disguise' and are designed to increase manu-
facturing costs, thereby restricting their access to the markets of
the developed countries.3"
1. Free Movement of Goods
Free trade is the unlimited exchange of commerce between
buyers and sellers across national borders."1 Although free trade
is often painted as anti-environment, 2 it does not necessarily re-
quire the elimination of environmental regulations.33 As long as
a country's environmental regulations do not discriminate
against non-domestic companies, these regulations will not con-
flict with free trade." The conflict between free trade and envi-
ronmental protection arises when the lack of technology to im-
plement environmental.regulations causes companies to lose ac-
cess to markets in developed countries.3 5 By precluding
companies from these markets, developed countries have unin-
tentionally created a non-tariff barrier to trade. 6
meed advanced environmental standards in developed countries and may lose access to
those markets." Id.
28. Bronwen Maddox, Business and the Environment: Troubled Waters - The Uruguay
Round May Be Concluded, But It Leaves a Handful of Potential Trade Conflicts, FIN. TIMES,
June 15, 1994, at 18.
29. See After Free Trade Euphoria, Now Comes the Hard Part, 13 Daily Rep. for Execu-
tives (BNA) Supp. No. 14, at D109 (Jan. 20, 1995) [hereinafter After Free Trade Euphoria]
(noting that trade ministers of several developing countries said they were concerned
that environmental protection could become pretext for trade protectionism).
30. Id. For developing countries, there is a "general feeling of anxiety that these
new tendencies will restrict access to new markets... since many Latin American coun-
tries have neither the technology nor the resources to respond to such demands." Envi-
ronmental Policies: Where are the Trade Barriers?, Bus. & ENv., Jan. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Environmental Policies].
31. Wathen, supra note 1, at 5.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 5.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 10.
36. See Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, "To Dream the Impossible Dream ": Globalization and
Harmonization of Environmental Laws, 20 N.CJ. Irr'L L. & CoM. REG. 205, 211 (1995)
(explaining why environmental regulations are considered non-tariff trade barriers).
"Because the regulations have an effect on trade, even though they are not specifically
related to it, they are considered 'non-tariff trade barriers' that operate as obstacles to
economic development." Id.
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2. Developing Versus Developed Countries
The creation of trade barriers because of environmental
regulations has led free trade proponents to advocate for the
harmonization of environmental regulations throughout the
world.3 7  Theoretically, with the same environmental regula-
tions, no discrimination could exist as a result of environmental
regulations.3 " The problem, however, is in reaching a compro-
mise on the appropriate level of environmental protection.3 9
Developed countries would lobby for high environmental pro-
tection, 4° and corporate lobbyists and developing countries
would lobby for low international environmental standards.41
An example of such a fear42 has been voiced by the Vene-
zuelan government with regard to Clean Air regulations for re-
formulated gasoline.4 3 The Clean Air Rule required non-U.S. re-
finers to use a different formula to comply with the regulation
from U.S. refiners." At the first session of the WTO's dispute
settlement body,45 Venezuela registered a dispute on U.S. im-
ported gasoline regulations.4 6 Venezuela initially brought this
37. World: World Trade and Environment, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, June 21, 1994, at
91.
38. See Wathen, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that harmonized environmental regula-
tions throughout world would provide situation where non-domestic companies are not
at disadvantage with respect to domestic companies).
39. See id. at 19-21 (describing previous attempts in harmonizing international and
national environmental regulations).
40. Id. at 10.
41. Id.
42. Environmental Policies, supra note 30. Another country with a similar fear is
South Korea. Id. An editorial in a South Korean newspaper expressed fears that higher
standards on energy efficiency and emissions will restrict import of South Korean com-
bustion engines and electronic goods. Id.
43. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.91 (a) (1) (1994) (stating baseline requirements for importers
of gasoline); 59 Fed. Reg. 22,800 (1994) (requesting comments regarding amendment
of non-U.S. refinery baselines).
44. See Clean-Air Rule Defied by Venezuela Under GATT May Be Killed, WALL ST. J., Mar.
18, 1994, available in Westlaw, Allnws File (noting that Caracas argued that U.S. E.P.A.
rule discriminates against non-U.S. oil companies because U.S. formula, based on Vene-
zuela's 1990 gasoline production, differs from one used by US. companies).
45. See GATT DSB, supra note 20, art. 2, at 1226 (establishing Dispute Settlement
Body).
46. Venezuela Brings Gasoline Dispute to WTO, Reuters, Feb. 10, 1995, available in
Westlaw, Int-News File. "Venezuela and the United States have agreed to discuss their
dispute over U.S. regulations on imported gasoline under the speedier proceeding of
the World Trade Organization .... ." Id.
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dispute under GATr in October 1994."7 On January 11, 1995,
Venezuela withdrew the initial complaint and brought it to the
WTO, with hopes for an expeditious resolution.48 Under WTO
rules, the two countries have sixty days to hold bilateral talks.' 9
If there is no resolution from the talks, Venezuela could ask the
WTO to establish a panel to resolve the dispute.5"
3. Cost to Developing Countries
Developing countries have argued that the cost of imple-
menting environmental regulations of developed countries is a
protectionist barrier to trade.51 Potential areas of concern are
restrictions on recycling content of packaging, 2 the quantity of
heavy metals," and packaging labeling.54 Regulation of this
scope will undoubtedly mandate regulatory oversight.55
Another possible cost to implementing solid waste reduc-
tion regulations is the availability or access to modern reclama-
tion technology to process solid waste. 56 Specifically, the re-
47. Id.
48. GATI DSB, supra note 20, art. 3(11), at 1227. Although the WTO is now a
reality, any cases brought to the GATT dispute resolution board beforeJanuary 1, 1995,
can still be decided under the pre-WTO rules. Id. The 1947 GATT treaty and dispute
mechanism will continue to exist this year in parallel with the successor WTO. WTO
Completes Organization, Agence Europe, Feb. 10, 1995, available in Westlaw, Int-News
File.
49. Venezuela Brings Gasoline Dispute to WTO, supra note 46. Talks began with the
United States on February 24, 1995. Id.
50. GATT DSB, supra note 20, art. 4(7), at 1228.
51. See Frances Williams, First Steps to 'Green the GATT' - A Look at Preparations for a
Negotiating Programme for Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development After Uruguay,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1994, at 7 (noting fear of developing countries that environmental
move to 'green GAT' is merely another name for protectionism). "There is... a wide
gulf between the views of environmentalists, who favour changing GATT rules to facili-
tate the use of trade restrictions for environmental protection, and those of developing
countries who fear that moves to 'green the GATT' may spread a virulent new form of
protectionism." Id.
52. Roger King, Recycling Laws Vulnerable Under GATT, Ptsrics NEWS, Dec. 12,
1994, at 4. "GATT requires similar treatment for similar or like products that serve the
same function. If virgin and recycled products are classified as similar, state recycling
laws can be challenged for giving unfair advantage." Id.
53. US.A: Citizens Trade Campaign Denounces GATT Tuna Boycott Decision, PRNew-
swire, May 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
54. Environmental Policies, supra note 30.
55. See Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive, European Commission Press Release
(Dec. 15, 1994) (requiring national harmonized databases as monitoring mechanism
for implementing Directive objectives).
56. SUSAN E. SELKE, PACKAGING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 124-28 (1990).
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cycling of containers made of composite or multilayer materi-
als5 7 would require sophisticated recycling processes that may
not be available to all non-EU countries.58 Lack of advanced re-
cycling technology could limit import and export of certain
products unless these products are repackaged or special licens-
ing fees for waste reprocessing are paid.59
B. GATT
The GATT is a contractual agreement between member
countries with the common objective that trade be conducted
without discrimination.6" As of January 1995, the WTO began
oversight of all GATT agreements. Disputes between Member
States can be brought to a WTO Dispute Settlement Body and
resolved.6" Environmental protection regulations will conflict
with the WTO's goal of free trade if they are found to discrimi-
nate between Member States.62
1. Structure of GATT
The GATT is a multilateral agreement with the common
goal of reducing tariffs between member countries. Since 1947,
GATT has sponsored rounds of multilateral trade negotiations
that have cut tariffs on manufactured goods from forty to five
percent.63 The Uruguay Round was the eighth international
trade agreement undertaken under GATT.' 4 With the reduction
57. Id. at 171. An example of a multilayer product that is difficult to recycle is one
containing a combination of paper and plastic, such as a juice box. Id. Separating
paper from plastic is very difficult. Id. If the plastic is not separated, it could cause
serious problems in the paper making process by building up in the papermaking
equipment. Id.
58. Id. at 129-31.
59. See Wathen, supra note 1, at 10 (lack of technology preventing developing
countries from selling in certain markets).
60. See GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. 111(2), 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 205
(noting that imported products will not be treated differently from domestic products).
61. GATT DSB, supra note 20, art. 4(7), at 1228.
62. See Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 36, at 211 (noting that environmental protec-
tion polices frequently conflict with economic polices, including free-trade theories).
One hypothetical example of such a trade barrier occurs when a country attempts "to
protect the environment or the health of its citizens [and creates] barriers to the impor-
tation of foreign products [by not meeting] the country's regulations." Id.
63. Wathen, supra note 1, at 6.
64. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 38. GATT 1947 began the trend in reducing tariffs.
Id. at 36. The following rounds at Annecy (1949), Torquay (1950), Geneva (1956), and
Dillon (1961) continued this trend. Id. at 36-37. The sixth round, Kennedy (1962-
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of tariffs came the concomitant rise of non-tariff barriers.6" As
with tariffs, non-tariff trade barriers trigger GATT oversight
when a trade barrier discriminates between domestic and non-
domestic countries.66
There are two ways GATT is enforced.67 In the case of a
non-domestic company violating the GATT in the domestic mar-
ket, the injured company can ask the home government to im-
pose trade sanctions on goods entering the home market.6 In
the case of a domestic company's export sales being reduced be-
cause of GATT violations, the company can ask its government
to lodge a formal compliant with the GATT Secretariat.69
To lodge a formal complaint, the disputing countries must
first conduct diplomatic negotiations to resolve the dispute.7" If
the matter cannot be resolved, a WTO dispute panel is ap-
pointed to resolve the dispute.7' If the dispute resolution board
votes in favor of the complaining party, the penalty for the losing
party would be modification of the dispute law or regulation to
eliminate the trade barrier 72 or payment of trade sanctions.7 3 As
opposed to the old version of GATT, no veto by the losing coun-
1967), "planned to look seriously at non-tariff barriers, but that aim was only minimally
achieved." Id. at 36. The Tokyo round (1973-1979) was "the first major negotiating
round to make non-tariff barriers the priority objective of the negotiation." Id. at 36-37.
65. Id. at 37. The subject of non-tariff barriers first arose in the Tokyo Round of
GAIT negotiations. Id. at 36-37.
As GATT became established, and tariffs were substantially reduced, non-tariff
barriers became significantly more important. Many domestic producer inter-
ests began turning to a variety (more than a thousand) of non-tariff barriers as
a way to minimize the competition from imports, since tariffs would no longer
provide that type of protection.
Id.
66. See GAIT 1947, supra note 2, art. 111(2), 61 Stat. at A18-19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 205
(noting that GATT Member States must treat imported and domestic products equally).
67. Wathen, supra note 1, at 12.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. GATr DSB, supra note 20, art. 19(1), at 1237. "Where a panel or the Appellate
Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recon-
mend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agree-
ment." Id. The body in charge of settling the dispute is called the Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB"). Id. art 1(2), at 1226.
73. Id. art. 22(1), at 1239. "Compensation and the suspension of concessions are
- . . measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not
implemented within a reasonable period of time." Id.
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try is allowed under the WTO.74 The resolution stands unless all
members of the WTO decide by consensus to veto the ruling.75
As a result, an adverse ruling concerning an existing environ-
mental law could recommend that the member country substan-
tially modify its laws or standards to conform to WTO regula-
tions.7 6
2. Pre-WTO Environmental Cases
Three GATT panel dispute rulings have defined what envi-
ronmental regulations conflict and do not conflict with GATT.7 7
Two tuna-dolphin cases, involving an environmental law's dis-
criminatory language against non-U.S. countries, conflicted with
GATT. On the other hand, the CAFE dispute, involving an envi-
ronmental law that applied equally to domestic and non-domes-
tic companies, was held non-discriminatory and not a trade bar-
rier.
a. Tuna Dolphin Dispute Between Mexico and the
United States
In 1991, the Mexican government brought a trade dispute
to a GAT tribunal alleging that U.S. tuna quota restrictions pur-
suant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act 78 ("MMPA") vio-
74. The Vote on GATT: The Trade Pact's Key Provisions, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at
A8.
75. GATT DSB, supra note 20, art. 16(4), at 1235.
Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members,
the report shall be adopted at a [Dispute Settlement Board] meeting unless a
party to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the
DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.
Id.
76. Id. art. 19(1), at 1237.
77. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report
on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1623 (1991) [herein-
after Tuna Panel I]; Tuna Panel II, supra note 4, 1 6.1-6.2, at 899 (noting that MMPA
environmental law was trade barrier); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dis-
pute Settlement Panel Report on United States Taxes on Automobiles, 6.1-6.2, 33
I.L.M. 1397, 1457 (1994) [hereinafter CAFE Dispute] (noting that U.S. CAFE regula-
tion was not trade barrier).
78. 16 U.S.C §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Under the MMPA, if a coun-
try's fishing operations take more than one and one quarter times the number of
marine mammals taken by the United States during the same time period, the Secretary
of the Treasury may ban the imports of that country's fish and fish products. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a) (2) (b) (II).
Mexico was targeted as an offending country under GATT because its tuna fishing
grounds were in Eastern Tropical Pacific ("ETP"). Tuna Panel I, supra note 77, 1 2.2, at
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lated free trade principles.79 The dispute concerned a U.S. boy-
cott against tuna captured in a purse seine fishing net.80  In ad-
dition to trapping tuna, these nets caused many dolphins to
drown.8 '
Mexico argued that the MMPA and its associated regula-
tions were import restrictions and violated Article XI of the
GATT.81  In turn, the United States argued that the measures
under the MMPA were internal regulations and thus valid under
Article 111(4).83 Article 111(4) prohibits a contracting party from
discriminating between its own domestic products and imported
products regarding matters of internal taxation and regulation.84
The United States argued that the MMPA treated U.S. and non-
U.S. tuna alike and that the MMPA regulated the internal sale of
products, which is allowed under Article 111(4).8
The GATT dispute panel held that the regulation based
1598. In the ETP, dolphins travel with tuna. Id. They do not travel with tuna in other
oceans of the world. Id.
79. Id. 11 1.1, 3.1-3.5, at 1598, 1601.
80. Hon. R. Kenton Musgrave & Garland Stephens, The GATT-Tuna Dolphin Dis-
pute: An Update, 33 NAT. REsoURCES J. 957, 958 n.1 (1993). A purse seine net is a net
weighted on one end and buoyed on the other end. Id. Its purpose is to encircle a
school of fish. Id. The bottom of the net is closed by drawing a line through rings
attached to the weighted end and trapping the fish inside. Id.
81. Id. 2.2, at 1598. The fishing net encircled both the tuna and the dolphins,
causing many of the air-breathing dolphins to drown. Id.
82. GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XI(1), 61 Stat. at A32-A33, 55 U.N.T.S at 224.
Article XI(1) forbids restrictions on imports other than duties, taxes, or other charges.
Id.
83. Id. art. I(4), 61 Stat. at A18-A19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 205-09.
84. Id. Article III states:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges.., should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly,
to like domestic products...
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory... shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded
to like products or national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and re-
quirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transporta-
tion, distribution or use.
Id. In addition, the explanatory comments accompanying Article III allows a regulation
or internal tax to be applied on imported products if it is also applied to domestic
products. Id., n. add. art. III.
85. Tuna Panel 1, supra note 77, 3.6(a), at 1601. "The United States requested
the Panel to find that: (a) The measures imposed under the MMPA with respect to
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upon fishing methods, rather than physical condition, violated
the GATT principle of treating imported and domestic products
alike.86 The panel reasoned that the power to enforce domestic
regulations on imports at the border is limited to regulations
that pertain directly to the imported product itself, and not to
the underlying production processes.8 7 Thus, a regulation, that
addressed the taking of dolphins would not affect tuna as a prod-
uct.88 The panel concluded that if a contracting party applied
environmental regulations to non-domestic products at the time
of the importation, such regulations would constitute quantita-
tive restrictions if they did not regulate an innate quality of the
product.8 9
In addition, the United States argued that even if the meas-
ures violated GATT, the embargo was valid under Article XX.90
The United States further argued that the tuna ban and the
MMPA were justified under Article XX(b) because they served
the sole purpose of protecting the dolphin.91 The panel, how-
ever, held that the language of Article XX(b) did not apply to
measures outside the jurisdiction of the contracting party.92 In
response to the U.S. argument that the MMPA measures were
justified under Article XX(g) because they were primarily aimed
at preventing the capture of dolphins, 93 the panel disagreed be-
cause a contracting party can only control production within its
certain domestic yellowfin tuna from Mexico were internal regulations ... consistent
with Article III:4;...." Id.
86. Id. 5.15, at 1618. "Regulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to
the taking of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product." Id.
87. Id. at 1 5.14-5.15, at 1618.
88. Id. 1 5.15, at 1618.
89. Id. 5.14, at 1618. "[T]hese regulations [the MMPA] could not be regarded
as being applied to tuna products as such because they would not directly regulate the
sale of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna as a product." Id.
90. Id. 3.27, at 1605. Article XX allows for certain exceptions to Article XI.
GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60-A62, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262-64. These
exceptions are: 1) Article XX (b) - measures necessary to protect human, animal, or
plant life or health, 2) Article XX (d) - measures inconsistent with GATT, and 3) Article
XX (g) - measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption. Id.
91. Tuna Panel I, supra note 77, 3.33, at 1606. "[T]he MMPA embargo was nec-
essary to protect the life and health of dolphins." Id.
92. Id. 11 5.28-5.29, at 1620.
93. Id. 1 3.40, at 1607.
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jurisdiction.94 The GATT dispute panel ruled that the U.S. em-
bargo of Mexican tuna products violated Article XI (1) ,5 and Ar-
ticle XX exceptions 96 were not applicable.97
The panel, however, determined that the labeling provi-
sions of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act98
("DPCIA") did not violate GATT.99 The restriction on the right
to use a "dolphin-safe" label applied equally to all countries who
chose to harvest tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific.' 0 The
DPCIA did not distinguish between products originating in Mex-
94. Id. 5.31, at 1621. "Article XX(g) was intended to permit contracting parties
to take trade measures primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions on produc-
tion or consumption within their jurisdiction." Id.
95. Id. 5.18, at 1618. "No prohibitions or restrictions... whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory
of any other contracting party." GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XI(1), 61 Stat. at A32-
A33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224.
96. GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60-A62, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262-64.
Article XX only protects conservation measures within a country's jurisdiction. Id.
Countries "may not restrict imports of a product merely because it originates in a coun-
try with environmental policies different from its own." Tuna Panel I, supra note 77,
6.2, at 1622.
97. Id. 5.28, at 1620.
The United States had not demonstrated to the [GATr] Panel - as required of
the [contracting] party invoking an Article XX exception - that it had ex-
hausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection
objectives through measures consistent with the General Agreement, in partic-
ular through the negotiation of international cooperative agreements, which
would seem to be desirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters of
many states and the high seas.
Id. Tuna Panel I did not consider Article XX exceptions applicable because the United
States had not demonstrated that it had used all other means to stop the killing of
dolphins before resorting to the embargo.
Moreover, even assuming that an import prohibition were the only resort rea-
sonably available to the United States, the particular measure chosen by the
United States could in the Panel's view not be considered to be necessary
within the meaning of Article XX(b). The United States linked the maximum
incidental dolphin taking rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular
period in order to be able to export tuna to the United States to the taking
rate actually recorded for [U.S.] fishermen during the same period. conse-
quently, the Mexican authorities could not know whether, at a given point of
time, their policies conformed to the [U.S.] dolphin protection standards.
The Panel considered that a limitation on trade based on such unpredictable
conditions could not be regarded as necessary to protect the health or life of
dolphins.
Id.
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
99. Tuna Panel I, supra note 77, 5.44, at 1622.
100. Id. 5.43, at 1622.
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ico and products originating in other countries. 1° 1 In addition,
the labeling provisions of the DPCIA did not restrict the sale of
tuna products, 10 2 as products with or without the "dolphin-safe"
label could be sold freely in the United States.' 03
The Tuna Panel I tribunal stated that a GATT member may
control the consumption of an exhaustible natural resource only
to the extent that it is under its jurisdiction. 0 4 This limitation
would only apply to actions outside the member country's bor-
ders.' 5 The panel stated that GATT imposes few constraints on
the ability of signatory nations to implement their environmen-
tal policies domestically. 106 Regulating products would not con-
flict with GATT as long as the treatment for imported and do-
mestic products was the same and non-discriminatory. 0 7
Mexico did not pursue the matter before the GATT Coun-
cil' 8 for political reasons.'0 9 As a result, the panel ruling had no
101. Id.
102. Id. 5.42, at 1622.
103. Id.
104. Id. 5.31, at 1620. In response to this extra-territorial limitation, some com-
mentators have recommended that "GATT should be amended to allow for some extra-
territorial applications of domestic environmental law, especially where resources being
protected are part of the international commons." Don Mayer & David Hoch, Interna-
tional Environmental Protection and the GATT: The Tuna/Dolphin Controversy, 31 AM. Bus.
LJ. 187, 192 (1993).
105. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (stating that Article XX(b) did not
apply to measures outside jurisdiction of GATT contracting party).
106. Tuna Panel I, supra note 77, 6.2, at 1622.
107. Id. "[A] contracting party is free to tax or regulate imported products and
like domestic products as long as its taxes or regulations do not discriminate against
imported products or afford protection to domestic producers." Id.
108. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT Doc. L/4907, BISD 26S/210 (1980), Annex: Agreed
Description of the Customary Practice of the GATr in the Field of Dispute Settlement
(Article XXIII:2), 6. "The reports of working parties are advisory opinions on the law
of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES may take a final decision." Id. All members of
the GATT council must finalize GATr rulings by consensus for the ruling to have legal
force. SeeJACKSON, supra note 2, at 65 (noting that losing party may block adoption of
panel report because of "consensus rule"). Because Mexico chose not to finalize the
GATr ruling and continue proceedings in the GATT, the panel ruling has no legal
force. See Establishment of Dispute Settlement Panel Concerning U.S. Import Restric-
tion on Certain Tuna, 57 Fed. Reg. 38,549 (Aug. 25, 1992).
The Governments of the United States and Mexico have worked together
since the issuance of the panel report to resolve their dispute without further
proceeding in the GAIT. The panel report has not been adopted by the
GATT Council of Representatives and consequently is not an official determi-
nation of U.S. obligations under the GATT.
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legal force." t Mexico and the United States resolved the dis-
pute by entering into a compromise agreement in June 1992.111
b. Tuna Dolphin Dispute Between the European Union and
the United States
The U.S. boycott that affected Mexican tuna fishermen also
impacted nations that purchase and process Mexican tuna. 1 2
Under the MMPA,"13 the U.S. Secretary of Treasury can ban im-
ports from countries that buy fish for reexport from an offend-
ing country. 1 1 4 On March 15, 1991, the National Marine Fisher-
ies Services announced a second embargo on Italy, France, Costa
Rica, Japan, and Panama." 5
As a result, the European Union and the Netherlands filed a
109. See Pro-Dolphin Accord Made, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1992, at D9 (discussing agree-
ment between United States and Mexico to stop setting tuna nets around dolphins'
thereby resolving trade dispute); Larry B. Stammer, White House Urges End to Ban on
Mexican Tuna, LA TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1992, at A3, A22 (noting that Mexico, fearing loss of
NAFTA approval, declined to press GATT contracting parties to ratify GATT Panel rul-
ing in its favor).
110. Timothy Noah & Bob Davis, Tuna Boycott is Ruled Illegal ly GATT Panel, WALL
ST. J., May 23, 1994, at A2. Mexico at the time feared that the dispute would spoil its
chances for gaining U.S. congressional approval for the North American Free Trade
Agreement. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289;
1993 WL 572901 (NAF.TA) (establishing free trade zone in Canada, United States,
and Mexico).
111. Pro-Dolphin Accord Made, supra note 109, at D9. The compromise resulted in
the United States implementing the International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992,
16 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. V 1993), which lifted the tuna import ban. Michael Parrish,
United States Approves Pact to Protect Pacfic's Dolphins, LA TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at D2. The
legislation also committed the United States to a five-year moratorium on dolphin-de-
pleting tuna harvesting methods, to which the parties agreed in the compromise. 16
U.S.C. § 1371(a) (Supp. V 1993).
112. Establishment of Dispute Settlement Panel Concerning U.S. Import Restric-
tion on Certain Tuna, 57 Fed. Reg. 38,549 (Aug. 25, 1992).
Pursuant to court order, the United States has, under the MMPA, prohibited
the importation of certain yellowfin tuna and tuna products from several
countries, including Mexico (as a 'primary embargo country') and from a
number of additional countries, including member states of the EC and the
Netherlands Antilles (as 'intermediary nations' or 'secondary embargo coun-
tries').
Id.
113. 16 U.S.C §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
114. Id.
115. National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration, Taking and Importing of Marine Mammah, 56 Fed. Reg. 12,367 (Mar. 25,
1991).
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complaint against the U.S. boycott.116 Although the panel again
ruled against the United States,1 7 the ruling is different from
the Tuna Panel I decision in that it recognizes the legitimacy of
the U.S. extraterritorial measures. 8 In arguing for the legiti-
macy of its extraterritorial measure, the U.S. government
claimed that the jurisdictional location of the resource to be
conserved was not relevant for the purposes of Article XX (g) or
(b) of GATT.119 The ordinary meaning of Articles XX(g) and
(b) contained no territorial or jurisdictional limitation on the
location of the resources to be conserved. 120 In addition, inter-
national agreements per se concern matters outside the jurisdic-
tion of one nation.12' International tribunals have routinely in-
terpreted treaty provisions to apply outside of the jurisdiction of
the country taking the measure. 22 The panel in Tuna Panel II
agreed with the U.S. arguments and eliminated the extra-territo-
rial limitation imposed in Tuna Panel L12' By eliminating this
limitation, the Panel conceded that the tuna embargo fell within
the exceptions covered by Article XX.124
The dispute panel, however, still ruled that the tuna boycott
violated GATI because it found that the embargo, meant to pro-
tect the dolphin, was not necessary for' the dolphin's conserva-
tion. 125 To invoke an Article XX(b) exception, the contracting
party's conservation measure had to be necessary to protect
animal life.12 6 As a result, the Tuna Panel II tribunal recom-
116. Tuna Panel II, supra note 4, 1.1-1.2, at 844.
117. Id. 1 6.1, at 899. "United States import prohibitions on tuna and tuna prod-
ucts ... did not meet the requirements of the Note ad Article III, were contrary to
Article XI:1, and were not covered by the exceptions in Article XX(b), (g), or (d) of the
General Agreement." Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 90 (describing Articles XX(g) & (b) of GATT).
120. Tuna Panel II, supra note 4, 3.16, at 854.
121. Id. 3.17, at 854.
122. Id.
123. Id. 1 5.16, at 891. It should not be said that "the General Agreement pro-
scribed in an absolute manner measures that related to things or actions outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the party taking the measure." Id. "[U]nder general interna-
tional law, states are not in principle barred from regulating the conduct of their na-
tionals with respect to persons, animals, plants and natural resources outside of their
territory." Id. 1 5.17, at 892.
124. Id. 1 5.33, at 896.
125. See id. 1 5.34-39, at 896-98 (discussing whether embargo was necessary to
protect dolphin).
126. GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. XX(b), 61 Stat. at A60-A62, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262-
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mended that the Member States request that the United States
modify the MMPA accordingly to conform with GAIT. 1
7
The United States appealed the ruling. 12 8 The U.S. Trade
Representative, 1 9 Mickey Kantor, has not said whether the
United States will block the GATT ruling if the appeal was unsuc-
cessful.' 3 0 He did say, however, that the United States would re-
fuse to alter the MMPA, which the U.S. courts' 3 1 have inter-
preted to require a boycott of tuna products from offending
countries.13
2
Legally, the GATT dispute resolution panel ruling has no
domestic legal effect.' 3 3 As stated in Suramerica De Aleaciones
Laminadas v. United States,' s4 GATT cannot trump domestic legis-
lation.135 If a statute is inconsistent with GATT, the U.S. Con-
64. "[N]othing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of measures... necessary to protect human, animal,
or plant life . . . ." Id.
127. Tuna Panel II, supra note 4, 1 6.2, at 899. "The Panel recommends that the
CONTRACTING PARTIES request the United States to bring the above measures into
conformity with its obligations under the General Agreement." Id.
128. Id. preface, at 839.
The United States Trade Representative indicated in a Press Release of May
23, 1994, that: "[tihe United States will challenge the dispute setdement
panel's failure to provide a fair hearing and due process, and will ask for a full
review of the report, both substantively and procedurally, by the GATT Coun-
cil, or reconsideration by the panel in this case."
Id.
129. See 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c) (1988) (defining Trade Representative's role as one
who negotiates and drafts trade agreements for final consideration by congress).
130. Noah & Davis, supra note 110, at A2.
131. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 975-76 (N.D. Cal. 1990),
aff'd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). Before this ruling, the U.S. government was not
enforcing the MMPA. Earth Island Institute, 746 F. Supp., at 968. Earth Island Institute,
a California lobbying group, brought suit to compel the government to enforce the
MMPA and won. Id. at 966. The court issued an injunction barring the importation of
yellowfin tuna harvested in the eastern tropical pacific from any nation, until the Secre-
tary of Commerce made a finding under MMPA that the average rate of dolphin deaths
for that nation was within the standards set by the MMPA. Id. at 976.
132. Noah & Davis, supra note 110, at A2.
133. Musgrave & Stephens, supra note 80, at 973.
134. Suramerica De Aleaciones Lamidas v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
135. See RE Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, Case 1/91, [1992] -
E.C.R. -, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 245, 275 (holding that dispute resolution panel rulings
also have no domestic legal effect in European Union). In RE Draft Treaty, the Euro-
pean Court ofJustice held that dispute resolution panels have no jurisdiction over mat-
ters requiring the interpretation of European Community law. Id.
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gress must remedy the situation. 3 6
c. European Union Dispute on U.S. CAFE standards
Other U.S environmental regulations that have triggered
GATT oversight are the Corporate Average Fuel Economy
3 7
("CAFE") regulation, the 1978 gas guzzler tax,138 and the 1991
luxury tax.'3 9 These regulations have been challenged as incon-
sistent with GATT by the European Union. 4 ° These environ-
mental regulations, however, were held by a dispute panel not to
conflict with GATT. 4 '
With regard to the luxury tax, 4 2 the European Union ar-
gued that the tax violated Article 111(2)143 of the GATT, which
prohibits a contracting party from imposing taxes on imported
automobiles that exceed taxes applied to domestically produced
vehicles.' The Union argued that automobiles costing over
US$32,000 were similar to automobiles costing less than
US$32,000, because they had the same end use and basic physi-
cal characteristics.14 5 Further, the Union argued that if the lux-
ury tax were applied in a neutral manner, there should be objec-
tive product differences 46 between cars priced above US$32,000
136. Suramerica, 966 F.2d at 668. "The GATT does not trump domestic legislation;
if the statutory provisions at issue here are inconsistent with the GATT, it is a matter for
Congress and not this court to decide and remedy." Id.
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 2002(a) (1988) (requiring automakers' fleets to average at
least 27.5 miles per gallon). This regulation has affected Mercedes Benz AG and Bayer-
ische Motoren Werke AG ("BMW"). Timothy Noah, GA7T backs Car-Fuel-Efficiency Rule,
Recognizing US. Environmental Laws, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1994, at A2.
138. See 26 U.S.C. § 4064(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (affecting cars with fuel effi-
ciency of less than 22.5 miles per gallon).
139. See 26 U.S.C. § 4001(a) & (b) (Supp. V 1993) (applying to passenger vehicles
weighing 6000 pounds or less and costing more than US$32,000). The retail excise tax
amounts to 10% of the excess of the retail price above US$32,000. Id. The tax does not
apply to the sale of any passenger vehicle used for commercial purposes. Id.
140. CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 1 1.1, 3.1, at 1399, 1402.
141. Id. 1 6.2, at 1457.
142. 26 U.S.C. § 4001 (Supp. V 1993).
143. GAT[ 1947, supra note 2, art. 111(2), 61 Stat. at A18-A19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 205-
09.
144. CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 1 3.3, at 1403.
145. Id. 5.2, at 1447.
146. Id. 3.78, at 1412. In its argument, the European Community cited the
GATTJapan-Alcoholic Beverages Panel which addressed taxation of "like products." Id.
In essence, the panel stated that taxes were justified as long as they were due to objec-
tive product differences. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement
Panel Report on Japan Alcoholic Beverages, BISD 34S/83, I 5.9(b). Thus, the Euro-
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and below US$32,000. 147 Thus, the application of the luxury tax
expressly violated Article 111(2).148
The United States argued that the luxury tax did not violate
Article III because contracting parties may recognize internal
taxes on imported and domestic products as long as they do not
protect domestic production under Article 11.149 It noted that if
the policy purpose for the tax were unrelated to the protection
of domestic production, then the tax was justified.150 After ex-
amining the objective and purpose of Article III in the context
of the GATT, the Panel concluded that the purpose of Article III
was not to prohibit regulations whose purpose was to achieve
other policy goals."' In light of this conclusion, the Panel then
examined whether the US$32,000 threshold distinction violated
Article III by protecting domestic production.15 The Panel held
pean Community argued that Japan could have justified its system of taxation on cer-
tain alcoholic products if it had "shown that tax differential corresponded to some ob-
jective product difference, such as much higher alcohol content of special grade
whisky." CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 3.79, at 1412.
147. See id. 1 5.1-5.2, at 1446-47 (arguing that reason for tax should have been
because of objective product difference).
148. GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. 111(2), 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 205. Arti-
cle III states that imported goods cannot be subjected to taxes in excess of those im-
posed on domestic like products. Id.
149. CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 1 5.3, at 1447.
150. Id. The United States argued that:
In determining whether automobiles over [US$32,000] were 'like' those sell-
ing for less .... it was necessary only to determine whether the [US$32,000]
threshold had been applied 'so as to afford protection to domestic produc-
tion.' The purpose of Article III was not to prevent contracting parties from
differentiating between products for policy purposes unrelated to the protec-
tion of domestic production.
Id.
151. Id. In support of its conclusion, the panel added that this same view has been
expressed by another GATT panel on a 1992 dispute concerning malt beverages. Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. No. DS23/R, BISD
39S/206 (1992). In that report, the panel stated that:
[t] he purpose of Article III [was] ... not to prevent contracting parties from
using their fiscal and regulatory powers for purposes other than to afford pro-
tection to domestic production. Specifically, the purpose of Article III is not
to prevent contracting parties from differentiating between different product
categories for policy purposes unrelated to the protection do domestic pro-
duction ....
Id.
152. CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 5.11, at 1449.
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that it did not.15 3  Automobile prices above and below
US$32,000 could not be considered like products under ArticleII()154111(2).~
With regard to the gas guzzler tax,155 the Union argued that
a difference in fuel economy was insufficient to make one auto-
mobile unlike another for the purpose of Article III(2).156 The
United States noted that under Article 111(2), a distinction could
be made as long as it was based on objective criteria aimed at
promoting a policy other than the protection of domestic pro-
duction.1 57 The Panel agreed with the United States1 58 and con-
cluded that the gas guzzler calculation methods could not be
construed as affording protection to domestic production159 and
was, therefore, in compliance with Article 111(2) and (4) of the
General Agreement. 6 °
The Panel disagreed, however, with the United States re-
garding the method the United States used to calculate penalties
under the 1974 auto fuel economy standards.' 6 1 The dispute
panel held that the CAFE regulation discriminated against Euro-
pean carmakers because the CAFE calculation was based on sep-
arate non-U.S. fleet accounting. 62 Under CAFE, a manufac-
turer could not average together the miles per gallon ("mpg")
ratings of its imported and domestic car fleets.' 63 Each manufac-
turer's passenger car product line was separated into "foreign"
and "domestic" fleets.' 64 The Panel held that this provision was
discriminatory and could not be justified under Article XX(g) or
(d) .165 The purpose for the separate averaging systems was not
153. See id. 5.15, 6.2, at 1449, 1457 (concluding that luxury tax on automobiles
was not inconsistent with Article 111(2) of GAT'r 1947).
154. Id. 5.15, at 1449.
155. 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (Supp. V 1993).
156. CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 5.19, at 1450.
157. Id. 5.20, at 1450.
158. Id. 5.38, at 1452.
159. Id. 5.31, at 1451.
160. Id. 5.38, at 1452.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 2002(a) (1988).
162. CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 6.1(c), at 1457.
163. Id. 3.288, at 1438.
164. 15 U.S.C § 2003 (b)(1) (1988). For the purpose of CAFE, a foreign car is
defined as any vehicle of which less than 75% of its value came from the United States
or Canada. Id. Section 2003 has been repealed. Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat.
1379 (1994).
165. CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 6.2, at 1457.
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to conserve an exhaustible natural resource, fuel, but to preserve
small car production in the United States. 166 In fact, as the Eu-
ropean Community noted, a report commissioned by the U.S.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 16 7 stated that the
two-fleet accounting rule should be eliminated because it had no
effect on fuel economy." Although it proposed the elimination
of the two fleet provision, the panel upheld the underlying
CAFE law as consistent with GATT. 1 69
3. WTO Dispute Mechanism
The World Trade Organization, ratified on April 15, 1994,
at a GATT conference in Morocco, succeeded the GATT and
became effective on January 1, 1995.170 The Marrakesh confer-
ence, composed of delegates from 117 nations171 finalized the
Uruguay Round of trade agreements, which had been under ne-
gotiation since 1986.172 These agreements established a code of
conduct for international commerce based on the principles
that trade should be conducted without discrimination, 73 that
166. Id. 3.288, at 1438. As stated in the legislative history of the CAFE law, the
foreign/domestic distinction was added at the request of the United Auto Worker's
union. Id. The union was concerned that CAFE would cause the Big Three manufac-
turers to import small cars to achieve U.S. fuel economy goals. Id. Because of this
concern, Congress added the two fleet rule to keep small car production in the United
States. Id.
167. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988). The National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration ("NHTSA") was created by The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966. Id. The 1966 Act gave the NHTSA to promulgate crashworthiness regulations.
Id. The 1966 Act has been repealed. Pub. L 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994).
168. See CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 3.289, at 1438 (stating that CAFE has no
connection to achievement of fuel economy and that consideration should be given to
eliminating provision).
169. Id. 5.66, at 1456. "This analysis suggested to the Panel that in the absence of
separate foreign fleet accounting it would be possible to include in a revised CAFE
regulation an averaging method that would render the CAFE regulation consistent with
the General Agreement." Id.
The European Union refused to accept the panel's findings. AfLerFree Trade Eupho-
ria, supra note 29, at D109. It is bringing the matter up to the WTO. Id.
170. See GATT 1994, supra note 17, art. III, at 1145 (describing implementation of
World Trade Organization).
171. See id. (signatures to Uruguay Round Instruments).
172. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 3. The latest GATT accord is known at the Uruguay
round because the negotiations for the agreement began in Montevideo, Uruguay in
1986. Id.
173. See GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. 111(2), 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 205.
Article XVI of GATT 1994 states that "the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, proce-
dures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT
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tariffs should be reduced through multilateral negotiations, 74
and that Member States should consult together to avoid trade
problems.17 In addition to handling oversight over trade in
goods, the WTO will now have oversight over trade in services, 176
intellectual property,177 and environment.1 78
The World Trade Organization will continue to operate, as
GATT 1947 did, on the basis of consensus and mutual agree-
ment. 79 However, there are differences between the WTO and
GATT 1947. Under GATT, countries could choose not to ob-
serve some GATT obligations, by vetoing panel decisions against
them.' 80 Dispute panel reports will be automatically adopted by
the WTO unless there is a consensus to reject them.' A losing
party may appeal to a permanent appellate body, but the body's
verdict will be binding."8 If offenders fail to comply with panel
recommendations, the winning party may have the right to com-
pensation. 83
1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947." GATT 1994, supra
note 17, art. XVI, at 1152.
174. GATT 1994, supra note 17, pmbl. 3, at 1144. The Member States of the
WTO will enter "into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barrier to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations." Id.
175. Id.
176. General Agreement on Tariff and Trade: General Agreement on Trade in
Services, annex IB, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
177. General Agreement on Tariff and Trade: General Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [herein-
after TRIP].
178. See General Agreement on Tariff and Trade: Decision on Trade and Environ-
ment, 33 I.L.M. 1267 (1994) [hereinafter GATT Environment] (stating need to identify
relationship between trade measures and environmental measures to promote sustaina-
ble development).
179. GATT 1994, supra note 17, art. IX(l) at 1148. Decision making is to be by
consensus, similar to GATr 1947. Id. at 1148 n.1. "The body.., shall be deemed to
have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member,
present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed
decision." Id.
180. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing consensus rule).
181. Frances Williams, GATT's Successor to Be Given Real Clout - The Likely Workings of
the World Trade Organization, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at 6.
182. GATr DSB, supra note 20, art. 17(14), at 1236. "An Appellate Body report
shall be adopted by the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] and unconditionally accepted
by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
Appellate Body report within [thirty] days following its circulation to the Members." Id.
183. Id. art. 19(1), at 1237.
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C. European Union
In the European Union, while free trade is the goal of the
Union, 18' the goal of the individual Member States is to write
their own environment laws. Although EU environmental regu-
lations are protected under Article 130r of the EC Treaty,1 85 dis-
tortions in trade may occur under the guise of environmental
protection. 186  German and Danish environmental packaging
regulations have caused trade distortions inside 187 and outside
the Community.'88
1. Article 30 and Free Movement of Goods
A quantitative restriction of goods restricts the import of a
given product by amount or value. 189 Such a restriction is the
antithesis of the free movement of goods and is prohibited in
Article 30 of the EC Treaty. 9 ° In addition to quantitative restric-
184. See EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 3(a) (stating that activities of Community
shall include elimination of customs duties, quantitative restrictions on import and ex-
port of goods, and that all measures have equivalent effect).
185. See id. art. 130r (defining objective and general principles of action by Com-
munity relating to environment).
186. Bruce Barnard, EU Packaging Recycling Law Takes Effect Jan. 1, J. CoM., Dec.
19, 1994, at A3. One example of a trade distortion is the result of Germany's Packaging
Law. Verpackungsverordnung -Verpack V [Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging
Waste], June 12, BGB1 I, June 20, 1991, at 1234, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1135 (1992)
[hereinafter Disposal Law]. "Germany's ambitious recycling laws have led to companies
to dump their waste in other member states because they lacked the capacity to meet
high [recycling] targets. Germany has 'exported' nearly 270,000 metric tons of waste in
1994. The 'importing' states argued [that] Germany was stifling their infant recycling
industries." Id. Before the European Union implemented its directive, its vice-presi-
dent, Sir Leon Brittan, worried that "there was a real danger that measures introduced
by Member States to protect the environment could easily damage free trade....
[D]istortions being caused by Germany's recycling laws were affecting competitions and
trade within the EC and beyond." Julian Hunt, Sir Leon Lends Weight to German Waste
Fight; Leon Brittan, Vice President of the European Commission, PACKAGING WE., Sept. 23,
1992, at 1.
187. Hunt, supra note 186, at 1.
188. Doral Cooper & Melissa Coyle, Special Report on International Trade, LGAL
TimEs, June 20, 1994, at 32. The Danish recycling requirement that all beer sold in
Denmark be in returnable glass containers has been said to discriminate against U.S.
beer, which is typically sold in recyclable aluminum cans. Id. The German packaging
requirement that manufacturers take back all packaging materials for goods sold in
Germany has been said to discriminate against imported goods handled primarily by an
agent, who is at a disadvantage (relative to local manufacturers) in developing a system
to collect and recycle packaging materials. Id.
189. DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNrrv LAw 208 (1993).
190. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 30. "Quantitative restrictions on imports and all
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dons, Article 30 also prohibits measures that have the equivalent
effect of a quantitative measure. 191
One example of a measure having an equivalent effect to a
quantitative restriction is a national rule imposing conditions on
imported products that are not imposed on domestic prod-
ucts. 192 Environmental regulations may also rise to the level of a
quantitative restriction if a national government subsidizes do-
mestic goods to the detriment of imported goods.19 Two EU
countries, Denmark and Germany, have triggered Article 30 vio-
lations over their packaging regulations. 194
a. Danish Bottle Law
Denmark had a bottle recycling program that required a de-
posit on the sale of bottles of beer and soft beverages.1 95 The
objective of the program was to keep undeveloped land and
open spaces free of discarded bottles.'9 6 By the mid-1970's, how-
ever, manufacturers were increasing the number of containers
used in selling beverages.1 97 The reclamation of these new con-
tainers was overloading Denmark's existing recycling plant ca-
pacity. 198
In 1981, Denmark passed Order No. 397 requiring beer and
soft drinks to be sold only in approved returnable and refillable
glass bottles.' 99 Penalties were prescribed for the sale of bever-
measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions,
be prohibited between member-States. Id.
191. Id.
192. WvATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 189, at 217.
193. See Clare Sambrook, A German Threat on Paper, MARMTING, Aug. 20, 1992
(noting that Germany's recycling effort is undercutting U.K. wastepaper prices by
15%).
194. See Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4607, [1989] 1
C.M.L.R. 619 (ruling that Danish bottle law violated Article 30 of EC Treaty); Patrick
Chalmers, Belgium: Commission to Challenge German Packaging Rules, Reuters News Service
-Western Europe, Oct. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, German Library, Allnws File (not-
ing that Commission is preparing challenge to German packaging ordinance).
195. Denmark, [1988] E.C.R. at 4619, [1989] 1 C.M.LR. at 622.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 4624, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627 (stating that Denmark's present re-
cycling system could not absorb more than thirty types of bottles).
199. Bekendtgorelse om emballage til o og l.skedrikke [Regulation on Contain-
ers for Beer and Beverages], Order No. 397, art. 2(2), Lovtidende A 1981,July 2, 1981,
at 1081. A description of an approved glass bottle is described in the Appendix of this
regulation. Bilag til bekendtgorelse om emballage til ol og laeskedrikke [Appendix to
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ages in non-approved containers. 20 0 These measures achieved
Denmark's objective of protecting the environment and stream-
lined the recycling of bottles.2 °' Producers of beverages and re-
tailers outside of Denmark complained that the legislation pre-
vented the importation of non-Danish beer and soft drinks in
their original containers because of the increased costs and ad-
ministrative difficulties associated with non-approved contain-
ers.
202
In response to these complaints, the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Union ("Commission") sent a letter of formal notice to
the Danish authorities saying that Order No. 397 violated Article
30 of the EC Treaty.20 3 As a result of the letter, the Danish gov-
ernment amended its regulation and promulgated Order No.
95, allowing the limited sale of beverages in non-approved con-
tainers, as long as the containers were not made of metal. 20 4
This amendment, however, was considered insufficient by the
Commission, and further discussions between the Commission
and Denmark failed. 05 On December 16, 1986, the Commis-
sion sought legal judgment against Denmark in the European
Court of Justice °6 for unfairly restraining free trade. 0 7 The
Regulation on Containers for Beer and Beverages], Order No. 397, Lovtidende A 1981,
July 2, 1981, at 1083.
200. Id. at 4620, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 622.
201. Id. at 4623, [1989] 1 C.M.LR. at 626. "The measures taken by Denmark in
relation to approved bottles are highly effective.... In the result, it is said, 99% of such
bottles are returned and they may be used up to 30 times." Id. Bottles that are not
returned by the purchaser are returned by those seeking a deposit. Id. "The result is a
cleaner countryside and a saving of raw materials." Id.
202. Id. at 4609, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 620. Examples of increased costs cited by
the Advocate General are the added cost incurred with the required transfer of bever-
ages from non-approved containers to approved glass containers, the cost of bringing
back empty bottles to the importers' plants in their Member States, or the cost of set-
ting up a bottling plant in Denmark. Id. at 4624, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627.
203. Denmark, [1988] E.C.R. at 4620, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 623.
204. Bekendtgorelse om aendring af bekendtgorelseom emballage til ol og
laeskedrikke [Amendment to Regulation on Containers for Beer and Beverages], Order
No. 95, art. 1 (1), Lovtidende A 1984, Mar. 16, 1984, at 345. "Order No. 95 of 16 March
1984... allow [s] the use of non-approved containers except for any of metal container,
either within well-defined limits ([3000 hectoliter] per producer per annum) or in or-
der to test the market, provided that a deposit-and-return system is established." Den-
mark, [1988] E.C.R. at 4609, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 620.
205. Id. at 4620, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 623.
206. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 165. The duty of the European Court ofJustice
is to interpret and apply the defining EU treaties and other community texts, legisla-
tion, and decisions. Id. art. 164.
207. Denmark, [1988] E.C.R. at 4607-08, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 619.
2212 FORDHAM1NTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:2187
Commission considered Denmark's mandatory recycling system
a measure equivalent to a quantitative restriction, contrary to Ar-
ticle 30 of the EC Treaty.208 Although the law applied to both
imported and domestic products, the Commission argued that
imported products were being placed at an unfair disadvantage
in relation to domestic products and that the law could be
achieved by less restrictive means.20 9
The European Court of Justice was confronted with the is-
sue of the extent to which environmental protection had prece-
dence over the principle of a common market.210 The United
Kingdom, intervenor,21 1 in support of the Commission, argued
that a balance between environmental protection and the free
movement of goods must be sought and that a bottle recovery
rate of ninety-nine percent was a disguised restriction to trade.
212
The Danish government argued that the legislation was justified
by a legitimate concern to protect the environment and to con-
serve resources. 1 3 It was not a disguised market barrier.21 4 In
addition, all parties to the dispute employed cost arguments to
support their respective sides of the argument.21 5 The Court
stated that cost arguments, on their own, would not justify a
208. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 30.
209. Denmark, [1988] E.C.R. at 4610-11, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 620.
210. Id. at 4611, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 620.
The Commission stressed that it attaches special importance to the question of
whether and to what extent the concern to protect the environment has prece-
dence over the principle of a common market without national frontiers since
there is a risk that Member States may in future take refuge behind ecological
arguments to avoid opening their markets to bear as they are required to do
by the case law of the Court.
Id.
211. Id. at 4629, 1 4, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 630. The United Kingdom was granted
leave by the Court to intervene in support of the Commission's conclusions. Id.
212. Id. at 4613, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 620. "Measures intended to achieve ex-
tremely high aims must be regarded as a means of arbitrary discrimination or a dis-
guised restriction on trade between Member States." Id.
213. Id. at 4615, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 620. It was not a disguised attempt to "wall
off the market." Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 4612, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 620. Denmark argued that the "adoption of
reusable containers and the setting up of refilling plants locally or event in the country
of origin would be more advantageous for a foreign producer than the use of non-
returnable containers." Id. The United Kingdom argued that metal cans, even with
their higher costs, were still being bought by the consumer, and were therefore not an
obstacle to the sale of the product. Id. at 4613, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 620.
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breach of the quantitative restrictions clause of Article 30.216
The Court upheld the ban on non-returnable containers. It
stated that the ban was necessary to achieve the EU objective of
protecting the environment.217 The Court, however, held that
the limitation on the sale of non-approved containers to 3000
hectoliters per producer per year was not justified.218 The Dan-
ish regulation was ruled discriminatory to non-Danish manufac-
turers because it restricted the free movement of beverages in
Denmark.219 In the balance between free trade and environ-
mental protection, the Court found the Danish environmental
regulation to be too restrictive of the free movement of goods.22 °
b. German Waste Disposal Law
The German Waste Disposal Law22 1 ("Disposal Law") was
implemented on June 12, 1991.222 With certain exceptions,2 2 3
216. Id. "The costs argument cannot justify a breach of Article 30." Id.
217. Id. at 4630, 13, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 631.
218. Id. at 4632, 1 22, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 632.
219. Id. at 4625, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 628. The Court held that
the system as it presently operates does have greater disadvantages for the
non-Danish brewer because the requirement that containers be reused, rather
than merely reycled, necessarily bears more heavily upon him that upon his Dan-
ish counterpart, and because the use of approved bottles for sales to the Dan-
ish market may well involve incurring additional overhead costs for plant and
bottling machinery. I am not satisfied that the costs imposed on Danish man-
ufacturers of collecting the bottles and sorting them is of the same order as
that faced by manufacturers from other Member States.
Id. (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 4626, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. at 629. In dicta, the Court even suggested that
the Danish government would have to lessen its environmental standards if no other
remedy were available to satisfy the ruling. Id. "There has to be a balancing of interests
between the free movement of goods and environmental protection, even if in achiev-
ing the balance the high standard of the protection sought has to be reduced." Id.
221. Disposal Law, supra note 186, 31 I.L.M. at 1135.
222. Id.
223. Id. art. 2(3), 31 I.L.M. at 1138. The exceptions to the German Waste Disposal
Law primarily concerned hazardous waste and other laws:
The provisions of the Regulation shall not apply to packaging [associated with
toxic substances or other legal provisions. They will not apply to packaging:]
1. with remnants or residue of substances or derivatives thereof that are
- dangerous to health pursuant to § 1, nos. 6-15 of the Regulation on the
Toxic Characteristics of Substances and Derivative Products pursuant to the
Toxic Substances Control Act, or
- dangerous to health within the meaning of § 3a(2) of the Toxic Substances
Control Act, such as plant protection agents, disinfectants or pesticides, sol-
vents, acids, lyes, mineral oil or mineral oil products,
2. subject to special disposal under legal provisions.
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this Disposal Law was aimed at a reduction of packaging waste by
minimizing both the weight and volume of the packaging and
reusing packaging materials.2 2 4 This law was intended to ensure
that waste disposal and recycling of used objects were not detri-
mental to the general welfare. 22 5 In an effort to protect the envi-
ronment, the German government now gave the responsibility
for packaging waste to the manufacturers22 6 of the waste, as op-
posed to the end users. 2 7 The ordinance required industry to
take back and reuse all one-way packaging on the German mar-
ket, with the exception of those handling hazardous wastes.
2 28
The regulations set dates for packaging goals to be
achieved. 229 By December 1991,230 all manufacturers and dis-
Id.
224. Id. art. 1(1), 31 I.L.M. at 1138.
225. Id. art. 2(3), 31 I.L.M. at 1138.
226. BETTE K. FISHBEIN, GERMANY, GARBAGE, AND THE GREEN DOT 147 (Sharene L.
Azimi ed., 1994). This concept of the manufacturer paying for the disposal of its waste
has led to a change in corporate thinking and a new manufacturing strategy for prod-
ucts. See id. (noting that product design is influenced by environmental regulations);
CURTIS MOORE & ALAN MILLER, GREEN GOLD -JAPAN, GERmANY, AND THE UNITED STATES
AND THE RACE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY (1994) (discussing premise that coun-
try's economic success in world will depend on developing "green" technologies aimed
at protecting environment).
One example of "green" product engineering is Apple Computer's response to the
DSD fee for its 21 inch monitor. FiSHBEIN, supra, at 67. Under the 1992 rules, the fee
was DM0.25. Id. In 1993, a new fee schedule based on the weight and material used in
the packaging was announced. Id. Under the new schedule, Apple's packaging cost for
the monitor increased sixteen times. Id. In response to these higher fees, Apple plans
to design packages that contain more cardboard and less plastic, thereby minimizing
the need to pay higher fees for plastics. Id. at 227. As seen from the table below, the
fees per pound of plastic are almost 10 times higher than for paper. See id. (citing
INFORM calculations based on DSD fees). The following Green Dot Fee Schedule be-
came effective October 1993:
Material US$ per Material Pound
Plastic 0.82
Composites 0.45
Aluminum 0.27
Tinplate 0.15
Paper/paperboard 0.09
Natural materials 0.05
Glass 0.04
Id.
227. Id. art. 3(5), 31 I.L.M. at 1138. The end user is defined as the purchaser who
does not sell the goods in the form supplied to him. Id. This means that the end user
can be not only private consumers, but also industrial and commercial undertakings or
individuals engaged in a trade or business. Id.
228. See id. art. 2(3), 31 I.L.M. at 1138 (discussing hazardous waste exception).
229. Id. art. 13, 31 I.L.M. at 1143.
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tributors were required to take back transport packaging, such as
crates or flats, used in the transportation of the goods. 231 By
April 1992,232 all outer or secondary packaging had to be col-
lected at the point of sale.2 3 By January 1993,34 the consumer
had the right to return all used packaging materials to the point
of sale. 35 If one could not comply with the law, a fee had to be
paid to the Duales System Deutschland GmbH ("DSD"). 236
By limiting the amount of non-reusable packaging in prod-
ucts sold within the country, the Disposal Law forces companies
to either develop recyclable packages for their products or col-
lect their discarded transportation packaging.2 7 If a non-Ger-
man company cannot collect and recycle the packaging itself, it
has to pay for a third party to provide this service.2 38 Because it
is less expensive for German companies to retrieve and recycle
their used packaging, non-German companies have argued that
this increase in the cost of imported products acts as a hidden
tariff and a trade barrier against their products.239
Although this law would indeed protect the environment,
little consideration was given by the German government to the
logistical difficulties of reclamation of waste materials in a non-
German country.2 ° Under the Disposal Law, the export com-
pany must arrange for a licensed waste disposal facility to handle
solid waste packaging or take direct responsibility for transport-
230. Id.
231. Id. art. 5, 31 I.L.M. at 1140.
232. Id. art. 13, 31 I.L.M. at 1143.
233. Id. art. 4, 31 I.L.M. at 1140.
234. Id. art. 13, 31 I.L.M. at 1143.
235. Id. art. 6(1), 31 I.L.M. at 1140.
236. Id. art. 5(2), 31 I.L.M. at 1140. "If the distributor does not himself remove
the packaging, he must indicate, by means of easily visible and legible notices at the
check-out, that the consumer has the possibility of removing the packaging from the
purchased goods and leaving it at the point of sale or on the premises .... " Id. To
comply with the law, the Duales System Deutschland GmbH ("DSD") was conceived
which arranged for collection points which guaranteed that packaging marked with a
Green Dot could be disposed at these points. See generally FISHBEIN, supra note 226, at
49-53 (describing establishment of DSD and its purpose).
237. Disposal Law, supra note 186, art. 6(3), 31 I.L.M. at 1140.
238. Id. art. 11, 31 I.L.M. at 1143.
239. See FISHBEIN, supra note 226, at 125 (citing U.S. Department of Agriculture
claims of discrimination). Importers argue that since they will have longer distances to
travel, their products will have more packaging, and they will therefore have to pay
higher fees. Id.
240. Dean E. Murphy, Germany's Recycling Nightmare, LA TIMS, Sept. 12, 1993, at
D3.
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ing it out of the country. 41 The transportation costs for recover-
ing and recycling exported packaging materials will affect the
price at which these goods can be sold to consumers.242 In addi-
tion, the recycling costs for transportation and secondary pack-
aging will curtail import trade on many products. 243
II. EUROPEAN UNION PACKAGING DIRECTIVE
The European Union Packaging Directive seeks to protect
the environment and eliminate trade barriers throughout the
Union.24  Without this EU-wide directive, waste measures intro-
duced by Member States governments could cause trade distor-
tions throughout the Union.2 45 By having each Member State
write its own laws to implement the Directive, however, the possi-
bility of fifteen disparate sets of laws will arise.24 Member States
with more aggressive packaging laws may trigger a complaint to
the WTO by non-EU manufacturers claiming that the Directive
is a barrier to trade.247
A. History of the European Union Packaging Directive
In 1991, the European Community, whose population den-
sity was then five times that of the United States, was concerned
over the shortage of landfill space.2 48 The Community had an
acute shortage of space to dispose of an estimated 2.2 billion
metric tons of waste annually.249 The European Community
targeted packaging as a major component of the municipal solid
241. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text (stating that manufacturers are
now responsible for their packaging waste).
242. See UK: Marketing Reports on Packaging - The Duales System? Nein Danke, Reuter
Textline, Aug. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Marketing File (stating that
Disposal Law has led to increase of nearly all goods in supermarket).
243. See MooRE & MILLER, supra note 226, at 36 (noting that Disposal Law has
caused companies to abandon use of pplyvinyl packaging, plastic foams, and 117 other
types of packaging).
244. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing purpose of Packaging
Directive).
245. See supra note 186 (discussing trade distortions caused by German Disposal
Law).
246. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of fifteen
different sets of laws from Member States).
247. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (defining non-tariff trade barriers).
248. Bob Hagerty, Europe Seeks to Be a Greener Continent, But Treaty Fails to Boost EC
Environmental Powers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1991, available in Westlaw, Allnws File.
249. Id. A metric ton is equal to 2204.62 pounds. Id.
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waste produced in the Community.25 ° Although the need ex-
isted to develop a plan to decrease the amount of waste pro-
duced and to reduce the amount of landfill space required, 5'
the European Community was still arguing over the best way to
deal with packaging waste.252
Meanwhile, Germany255 and other Member States were de-
veloping their own packaging laws. 54 Many importers regarded
these differing laws as cumbersome and unfair. 55 They desired
a uniform program for all EU countries.256 Intending to harmo-
nize 57 the packaging laws throughout the European Union and
to provide an alternative to filling limited landfill space, the
Commission 258 proposed a directive on Packaging and Packag-
250. FiSHBEIN, supra note 226, at 165. Packaging accounts for 25-30% of the total
municipal waste generated in the European Community. Id.
251. Hagerty, supra note 248.
252. Id.
253. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (discussing German Disposal Law).
254. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (describing Danish Bottle Regula-
tion).
255. See supra note 186 (describing effect of Disposal Law on trade in European
Community). The inconsistency of the legislation from one country to another was
considered by exporting companies unfair and posed a significant threat to the packag-
ing industry. Barnard, supra note 186, at A3. Companies wanted to comply with legisla-
tion, but found it difficult when all the Member States had different laws. Id. Packag-
ing legislation per se was not considered unfair by the exporting companies if it was a
uniform law. Id.
256. Id. Without an EU-wide law, there was a danger that countries with ambitious
recovery and recycling programs would limit certain types of packaging, thereby limit-
ing cross-border trade in packaged goods or packaging materials. Id.
257. European Rubbish - Tied up in Knots, EcoNoMIST, Jan. 28, 1995, at 62. Some
argue that these rules will not eliminate trade distortions in the European Union be-
cause they will not prevent countries from "using environmental rules as an excuse to
keep out competitors." Id. For example,
Germany insists that at least 72% of all bottles containing drink are refillable.
This hits the canning industry and favours existing local drinks suppliers.
Denmark also bans the use of drinks cans, whether made of steel or alumi-
num, thus protecting its local bottlers. Meanwhile, Belgium intends to intro-
duce an 'eco-tax', which will vary from one product to another according to
their environmental characteristics.
Id.
258. See EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 155 (delineating Commission's role in Com-
munity).
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the com-
mon market, the Commission shall:
- ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the
institutions pursuant thereto are applied;
- formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in
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ing Waste on July 15, 1992.259 After negotiations between the
Member States lasting over two years, a majority of the Member
States approved the directive on December 14, 1994,260 with
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands voting against it.2 61
B. Provisions of the Directive
The Directive covers all types and all kinds of packaging, 262
from hamburger wrappers to cardboard boxes that come with
consumer products such as televisions and refrigerators. 263 It re-
the Treaty, where the latter expressly so provides or if the Commission consid-
ers it necessary;
- have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of the
measures taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the man-
ner provided for in this Treaty;
- exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementa-
tion of the rules laid down by the latter.
Id.
259. Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive, supra note 55.
260. Environment: Packaging Waste Directive finally adopted, European Information
Service, Jan. 5, 1995, available in Westlaw, Allnws File.
261. Id. Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands were the three countries in the
European Union with the most advanced programs for recovering and recycling waste
packaging. Environmental Policies, supra note 30. They argued that the text of the Direc-
tive was not sufficiently ambitious and will force them to water down their own national
recovery and recycling targets. Id.
262. EU Packaging Waste Directive to be Enforced, RECYCLING LAWS INTERNATIONAL,
Feb. 1995, at 2 [hereinafter Packaging Enforcement]. "Every company supplying compa-
nies within the European Union with.raw materials for packaging, finish packaging,
packaging components or packaged goods will be affected by the Directive, as will dis-
tributors of packaged goods and companies engaged in the collection, sorting, recovery
or disposal of packaging waste." Id.
263. See Packaging Directive, supra note 9, art. 3(1), O.J. L 365/10, at 12-13 (1994)
(detailing scope of directive).
For the purposes of this Directive:
1. 'packaging' shall mean all products made of any materials of any nature to
be used for the containment, protection, handling, delivery and presentation
of goods, from raw materials to processed goods, from the produced to the
user or the consumer ...
'Packaging' consists only of:
(a) sales packaging or primary packaging, i.e. packaging conceived so as to
constitute a sales unit to the final user or consumer at the point of purchase;
(b) grouped packaging or secondary packaging, i.e. packaging conceived so
as to constitute at the point of purchase a grouping of a certain number of
sales units whether the latter is sold as such to the final user or consumer or
whether it serves only as a means to replenish the shelves at the point of sale; it
can be removed from the product without affecting its characteristics;
(c) transport packaging or tertiary packaging, i.e. packaging conceived so as
to facilitate handling and transport of a number of sales units or grouped
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quires Member States to adopt mandatory rates of recycling into
their packaging regulations.26 Within five years, the Member
States must: a) recover2 65 between fifty to sixty-five percent (by
weight) of their packaging waste; b) recycle twenty-five to forty-
five percent of all packaging materials contained in packaging
waste; and c) adopt substantially increased targets for recovery
and recycling.266 Member States must promulgate legislation,
regulations, and administrative provisions concerning the re-
quirements of the Directive by June 30, 1996.67
In addition, the new rules allow each country to meet the
environmental targets under their own individual guidelines. 68
Ireland, Portugal, and Greece were granted an extra five years to
implement legislation.26 9 Germany, Belgium, and DenmarkY
packaging in order to prevent physical handling and transport damage.
Transport packaging does not include road,rail, ship and air containers; ....
Id.
264. Id. art. 6(1)(b), OJ. L 365/10, at 14 (1994).
265. Id. arts. 3(6), 3(8), O.J. L 365/10, at 13 (1994). Recovery includes all
processes that recover value from waste, including waste-to-energy incineration., Id.
266. Id. art. 6(1), O.j. L 365/10, at 13-14 (1994). To comply with the Directive,
Member States shall take the necessary measures to attain the following targets
covering the whole of their territory;
(a) no later than five years from the date by which this Directive must be
implemented in national law, between 50% as a minimum and 65%' as a maxi-
mum by weight of the packaging waste will be recovered;
(b) within this general target, and with the same time limit, between 25% as a
minimum and 45% as a maximum by weight of the totality of packaging
materials contained in packaging waste will be recycled with a minimum of
15% by weight for each packaging material;
(c) no later than 10 years from the date by which this Directive must be imple-
mented in national law, a percentage of packaging waste will be recovered and
recycled ....
Id.
267. Id. art. 22(1), Oj. L 365/10, at 17 (1994).
268. Id. art. 6(5)-(6), O.J. L 365/10, at 14 (1994).
269. Id. art. 6(5), O.j. L 365/10, at 14 (1994). Greece, Ireland, and Portugal were
provided with more lenient regulations. Id.
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal may, because of their specific situation, i.e. re-
spectively the large number of small islands, the presence of rural and moun-
tain areas and the current low level of packaging consumption, decide to:
(a) attain, no later than five years from the date of implementation of this
Directive, lower targets than fixed in paragraph 1 (a) and (b), but shall at least
attain 25% for recovery;
(b) postpone at the same time the attainment of the targets in paragraph 1 (a)
and (b) to a later deadline which, however, shall not exceed 31 December
2005.
Id.
270. Haig Simonian, Packaging Issue Tied in Knots - An EU Directive is Proving Divi-
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which have stricter environmental standards than those men-
tioned in the Packaging Directive, can only implement stricter
standards as long as they can prove they have adequate recycling
capacity and their programs will have no adverse effect on the
other Member States.2 7 1
Another important aspect of the Directive is Article 15,
which contains an economic instruments clause. 72 This clause
allows Member States use economic instruments to implement
the Directive. 273 These economic instruments may take the form
of taxes, deposits, industry collection fees, or a combination of
the above.274
Specifically, Article 15 of the Directive allows Member States
to use the polluter pays principle in implementing the Direc-
tive.2 75 This principle states that those who pollute, or those who
do not use pollution control devices, must pay for part of the
cost incurred by recycling of their end product.27 6 Under the
polluter pays principle, failure to adopt pollution control is
analogous to an export subsidy which creates unfair trade advan-
sive, Explains Haig Simonian, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1995, at 18. Danish law requires indus-
try to recover 80% of packaging and recycle 50% by the year 2000. Id.
271. Packaging Directive, supra note 9, art. 6(6), O.J. L 365/10, at 14 (1994). Arti-
cle 6(6) states that
Member States which have, or will, set programmes going beyond the targets
of paragraph 1(a) and (b) and which provide to this effect appropriate capaci-
ties for recycling and recovery, are permitted to pursue those targets in the
interest of a high level of environmental protection, on condition that these
measures avoid distortions of the internal market and do not hinder compli-
ance by other Member States with the Directive.
Id. This provision was intended to address other EC countries' charges that Germany is
flooding EC markets with used packaging material. FISHBEIN, supra note 226, at 203.
272. Packaging Directive, supra note 9, art. 15, O.J. L 365/10, at 16 (1994). The
Economic Instruments clause of the Directive states that
[t]he Council adopts economic instruments to promote the implementation
of the objectives set by this Directive. In the absence of such measures, the
Member States may, in accordance with the principles governing Community
environmental policy, inter alia, the polluter-pays principle, and the obliga-
tions arising out of the Treaty, adopt measures to implement those objectives.
Id.
273. Id. art. 15, O.J. L 365/10, at 16 (1994).
274. Packaging Enforcement, supra note 262, at 2.
275. Packaging Directive, supra note 9, art. 15, OJ. L 365/10, at 16 (1994).
276. See David A. WVirth, The International Trade Regime and the Municipal Law of
Federal States: How Close a Fit?, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, LAw, ECONOMICS; AND
POLICY 33, 40-42 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993) (describing polluter pays princi-
ple).
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tages for industries with less strict environmental standards.277
The idea of the principle is to provide an economic incentive to
the manufacturer to limit the disposal cost of the product.278 A
manufacturer would thereby factor disposal costs into product
design, in the same way he would do for material, energy, and
labor costs.2 79  The approach of internalizing waste disposal
costs, however, is difficult to put into practice 280 because of the
problem in properly formulating the tax structure so that it truly
reflects disposal costs. 28
1
Another aspect of the Directive, which may trigger WTO
oversight, is its limitation of heavy metals in packaging.282 Many
inks on packaging owe their bright colors to the presence of
heavy metals such as cadmium and chromium.285 Because of
their toxicity, these metals must be eliminated from the waste
211stream. 84 In Article 11 (1), the Directive provides a schedule for
the reduction of heavy metal concentration levels in packag-
277. See id. at 41 (explaining Polluter Pays Principle and reasoning behind it).
278. Id.
279. SEtKE, supra note 56, at 157.
280. Id. "Calculation of the cost of disposal should take into account, at a mini-
mum, both the type of material (s) and their amount, as well as expected lifetime of the
object under consideration. It can be argued that the availability of alternatives should
be considered." Id. One example of a question that may be considered in determining
the cost is "[s] hould the cost of landfilling .... be based on current costs for existing
landfills, or estimated costs for new landfills that will be required as we fill up those
already in existence?" Id.
281. Id. at 164. A flat fee per package or article will not reflect the true cost of
waste disposal. Id.
[A] tax must reflect, at a minimum, both the type and the amount of material
used in the product or package on which it is being assessed. For example,
the tax on a high-density polyethylene bottle pigmented with cadmium should
be much higher (assuming cadmium is not banned altogether in this use) that
on a bottle of the same size and weight that did not contain heavy metals. The
tax should also reflect the probability that the product will be recycled, and
should also be lower for products made from recycled material. The tax on a
material which has fuel value should be lower than that on material which
must be landfilled. Obviously, formulating such a structure is a very complex
procedure.
Id.
282. Packaging Directive, supra note 9, art. 11, O.J. L 365/10 at 15 (1994).
283. See THE MosBY MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 364 (revised ed. 1992) (defining heavy
metals). Heavy metals are metals with a high atomic weight in the chemical periodic
table. Id. Poisoning can occur through breathing or absorption of various toxic heavy
metals, such as mercury and lead. Id.
284. Id.
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ing.285 This limitation will trigger WTO oversight if a non-EU
country is prevented from selling its products in the European
Union.
III. THE DIRECTIVE IS NOT A BARRIER TO TRADE
The Packaging Directive has given EU Member States until
June 30, 1996, to enact legislation that implements the provi-
sions set by the Union.286 Because the Member States have not
promulgated their national legislation, packaging ordinances
that were in place before the Directive will be assumed to be part
of the new packaging legislation. Although the Packaging Direc-
tive is an example of legislation that presents the conflict be-
tween trade and the environment, a close analysis of a potential
case brought in the WTO reveals that the Packaging Directive is
not a barrier to trade.
A. Article II. Like Product Analysis
Article III of the GATT states that imported products can-
not be discriminated from their domestic counterparts by higher
taxes.2 87 A dispute regarding the Directive may arise in which
importers claim that they are being discriminated against be-
cause they are paying higher fees to sell their product in the
European Union as opposed to their EU-based counterparts.
The issue is whether a product with packaging chosen to con-
form to the Directive is considered a like product to one that
does not conform to the Directive. Are toys packaged in recycl-
able and non-recyclable materials considered like products?
Under the definition that products are like products if they have
the same end use and the same performance characteristics,2 88
these two toys may be considered like products. A toy is still a
285. Packaging Directive, supra note 9, art. 11(1), OJ. L 365/10, at 15 (1994).
Article 11(1) states that:
Member States shall ensure that the sum of concentration levels of lead, cad-
mium, mercury and hexavalent chromium present in packaging or packaging
components shall not exceed the following:
- 600 ppm by weight two years after the date referred to in Article 22(1);
- 250 ppm by weight three years after the date referred to in Article 22(1);
- 100 ppm by weight three years after the date referred to in Article 22(1).
Id.; see id. art 22(1), OJ. L 365/10, at 17 (1994) (setting date as June 30, 1996).
286. Id. art. 22(1), O.J. L 365/10, at 17 (1994).
287. GATT 1947, supra note 2, art III, 61 Stat. at A18-A19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 205-09.
288. CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 5.2, at 1447.
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toy whether its outer packaging is recyclable or not, because the
toy functions the same way.
Under the German Disposal Law, a product sealed in plastic
blister wrap would be more expensive than one wrapped in pa-
per.289 Some manufacturers, however, use plastic wrapping be-
cause it protects the product from damage during transit and
safeguards the product from breakage while on the store's
shelves before the consumer buys the product. Lack of im-
proper packaging has caused damage to products during
transit.290
Another example of an increased cost might be a product
packaged in a material containing a heavy metal, like chromium.
Article 11 of the Packaging Directive restricts the concentration
of heavy metals in packaging.291 This restriction would require
an importer to find a means to quantify the amount of heavy
metals in its packaging and would incur unnecessary administra-
tive costs. Further costs would be incurred due to the certifica-
tion and inspection of imported products and its packaging.
1. European Union Arguments
For the moment, the Packaging Directive is uncontroversial
with respect to GATT. The Directive is uncontroversial because
the legislation implementing the Directive by the Member States
is still unknown. At this point one can only speculate as to their
content, but there will be disparate viewpoints between Member
States.
a. Conscious Business Decision
The European Union will argue that importers made a con-
scious business decision to wrap their products in plastic or pack-
age their products in materials containing heavy metals. Import-
ers might not have access to other alternatives, such as wrapping
289. FiSHBEIN, supra note 226, at 227. In Germany, packaging fees are nine times
higher for plastic ($0.82/Ib) than for paper ($0.09/1b). Id.
290. EC: Goods at Risk in Packaging Laws, Reuter Textline, Sept. 21, 1993, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File. As noted by Dr. Gerhard Luttmer of the German
insurer Gerling-Konz Allgemeine Versicherungs AG, "[packaging] laws [have] created
an obligation ... to minimize 'at any price' the packaging used for transport purposes.
This obligation will necessarily lead to a significant increase in the frequency of trans-
port damage due to inadequate packaging." Id.
291. Packaging Directive, supra note 9, art. 11, O.J. L 365/10, at 15 (1994).
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a product in another material or using vegetable-based inks.
This argument may seem reasonable in an arms-length discus-
sion between one developed country to another, as seen in the
CAFE dispute. 92 This may not be the case, however, in a devel-
oping country that does not have the resources or the physical
plant to package a product to the Directive's requirements. In
that hypothetical, there is no longer an arms-length argu-
ment.2 93 Developing countries do not have the choice of alter-
native methods readily at their disposal. As a result, they may
have to sell to the European Union and face the consequent
fees.
b. Internal Regulations
In response, the European Union will argue that the regula-
tions in the Packaging Directive are internal regulations and are
valid under Article III of GATT. 94 In Article III, the General
Agreement states that a member country cannot discriminate be-
tween its own products and another country's products regard-
ing matters of internal regulations.2 9 5 The European Union will
argue that the Directive does treat products from the European
Union and non-EU countries alike and that it merely regulates
the internal sale of products. Although a tax is placed on the
products, it is an allowed tax because it is an internal tax applied
equally to imported and domestic products. 29 6 As the GATT
292. See generally CAFE Dispute, supra note 77 (describing dispute between United
States and European Union).
293. See GATT 1994, supra note 17, pmbl. 1 2 (noting that WTO provides more
flexible guidelines for developing countries). In the preamble of the Agreement estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, the Contracting Parties recognized the "need for
positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensu-
rate with the needs of their economic development." Id. With regard to dispute settle-
ment, the WTO requires the Dispute Settlement Body to consider the impact its ruling
has on the economy of the developing country before publishing its decision. GATr
DSB, supra note 20, arts. 21(2), 21(7), 21(8); at 1238. "If the case is one brought by a
developing country Member, in considering what appropriate action might be taken,
the DSB shall take into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained of,
but also their impact on the economy of developing country Members concerned." Id.
art. 21(8), at 1238.
294. GATT 1947, supra note 2, art. III, 61 Stat. at A18-19, 55 U.N.T.S. at 205-09.
295. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing validity of domestic regu-
lations under Article III).
296. See id. (quoting Article III, which allows application of internal tax as long as
it is equally applied to imported and domestic products).
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panel stated in Tuna Panel I, nations may tax products as long as
the treatment for imported and domestic products are the same
and are non-discriminatory.297
c. Domestic Production Exemption
Cost arguments have been put forth every time environmen-
tal regulations are the cause of a trade dispute. In Denmark, the
European Commission as well as the intervenor United King-
dom cited situations where the importer had to repackage its
beverages from metal containers to approved glass containers
and incur the extra cost.2 98 In Denmark, the European Court of
Justice held that cost arguments were insufficient in determining
whether a Member State violated the quantitative restrictions in
Article 30 of the EC Treaty.29
Similarly, in the CAFE dispute, the EU's arguments and sta-
tistics, indicating that the Member States, especially Germany,
were paying a disproportionate amount of the fees incurred in
selling a luxury car in the United States, were insufficient."0 0
The GATT panel held that before one could have an Article III
violation, where one could show discrimination between domes-
tic and imported products, one has to show that the discrimina-
tion was for the purpose of protecting domestic production. As
the United States argued in the CAFE dispute, if the policy pur-
pose for the tax were unrelated to the protection of domestic
production, then the tax was justified.3 0 1 As its preamble states,
the purpose of the Packaging Directive was to provide a high
level of environmental protection. It was not meant to protect
domestic production.
The Directive as it stands does not conflict with Article III of
the GATT. The Directive is an internal regulation that will be
applied equally on domestic and imported products. Its purpose
is to reduce waste and conserve landfill space. Because the Di-
rective bears no language providing for separate regulation for
297. Tuna Panel I, supra note 77, 6.2, at 1622.
298. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (describing importer complaints
on increased costs in complying with onerous environmental regulations).
299. Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4607, 4615, [1989] 1
C.M.L.P, 619, 620.
300. CAFE Dispute, supra note 77, 5.2, at 1447.
301. Id. 5.3, at 1447.
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products originating from EU countries and from non-EU coun-
tries, it will not conflict with GATT.
2. Article XX(g) Exception
Even if Article III were violated, however, the Packaging Di-
rective would still be valid under Article XX(g). Article XX(g)
provides an exception to Article III if the measure in question
relates to conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. Given
that the Directive sought to reduce waste and conserve landfill
space, the Directive would qualify for an Article XX(g) excep-
tion.
CONCLUSION
Environmental protection and free trade must coexist. In
the beginning of the next century, the World Trade Organiza-
tion will be the stage for determining the appropriate balance
between the environment and trade. Although environmental
regulations are necessary to protect the environment, this pro-
tection should not inhibit trade. Of importance to the trade/
environment dilemma will be the findings of the WTO's Com-
mittee on Trade and Environment, which will be making recom-
mendations regarding environmental modifications to the multi-
lateral trading system. The answer to finding a balance between
free trade and environmental protection lies in some form of
managed trade, with the promulgation of minimum interna-
tional environmental standards that all signatories can agree
upon by consensus. For the countries with higher environmen-
tal standards, insertion of a pre-emption clause in the stricter
environmental statute will allow for its continuance. Legislation
that incorporates environmental costs, such as the polluter pays
principle, is a route to finding a compromise solution between
free trade and environmental protection. Sound implementa-
tion of the EU Packaging Directive that balances these concerns
is a step in the right direction.
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